

Institute of Environmental Medicine, Natick, Massachusetts.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Construction Battalion Center Davisville, Rhode Island

Category: Construction Battalion Center
Mission: Mobilization and Logistics Support
to Reserve Seabees
Cost to Close: \$36.6 million
Savings: 1992-97: -\$12.8 million;
Annual: \$5.5 million
Payback: 10 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Davisville and relocate three sets of equipment and tools for Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (RNMCB) and other pre-positioned war reserve material stock to the other Construction Battalion Centers at Gulfport, Mississippi, and Port Hueneme, California.

The projected reduction of RNMCBs and the ability of the other construction battalion centers to provide required mobilization support enable reduction in the Naval Construction Force support infrastructure. The personnel support facilities at Davisville are deteriorated and the facility will no longer be designated as a site for mobilizing Reserve personnel.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stated that Davisville had historically been critical for support of the Seabees and that the support is still needed, particularly for storage space and equipment repair. The community questioned the need to build new warehouse space when existing

Davisville buildings could continue to be used. The community also was concerned about the loss of jobs in an economically depressed area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that many of the facilities at Davisville are deteriorated and unusable. The ability of the other two construction battalion centers to support the major Naval Construction Force effort during Desert Shield/Storm demonstrated the ability of these bases to provide required support without Davisville.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Construction Battalion Center Davisville did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Construction Battalion Center Davisville.

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, California

Category: Naval Station
Mission: Support Tenant Activities
Cost to Close: 0
Savings: 1992-97: \$325,000;
Annual: \$319,000
Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Hunters Point Annex. Outlease the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning, Engineering, Repair, and Alterations

Detachment; and a contractor-operated test facility. This is a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation.

Hunters Point Annex has low military value because of significant encroachment that will result from congressionally mandated outleasing to the city of San Francisco. The infrastructure at the base is deficient. Moreover, this closure will have little impact on the economy or environment of the San Francisco area. Implementation costs will be minimal.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community is anxious to gain use of the land that Hunters Point occupies and thus did not argue against closure.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that few tenants use the facilities and that the piers are not in use. Closure removes 15,900 feet of excess berthing capacity. The outlease obligation renders the large Dry Dock 4 unusable for emergent repairs.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the DoD proposal did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing the Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island. Outlease the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning, Engineering, Repair, and Alterations Detachment; and a contractor-operated test facility. This is a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation.

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California

Category: Marine Corps Air Station
Mission: Support Marine Corps Aviation
Cost to Close: \$590.4 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$56.8 million;
Annual: \$0.4 million
Payback: 100 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Tustin, retaining family housing and related personnel facilities to support MCAS El Toro, California. Combine Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 16 with MAG 39 from Camp Pendleton and transfer the combined MAG, along with the Tustin's headquarters components and related units, to a new air station to be built at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California.

Before relocation, MAG 16 and MAG 39 at MCAS Camp Pendleton, California, will be combined. Projected requirements necessitate restructuring aviation support to complement combined-arms training. Only MCAS Yuma, Arizona, which has a unique mission, ranked lower than Tustin in military value. The air station and its air space are being encroached. The aging facilities have many deficiencies. Moving helicopter support to Twentynine Palms integrates it more closely with training for Camp Pendleton ground forces. Helicopter facilities at Camp Pendleton are located too far from training areas at Twentynine Palms to permit MAG-39 to play an integral role in ground-force training.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community supports closure of MCAS Tustin so the property can be commercially developed, thereby increasing the community tax base. The community also supports eliminating helicopter noise pollution. There is a minor economic impact of 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that there was not a significant force-structure reduction dictating the closure of an MCAS; however, MCAS Tustin has only a slight excess capacity. There is significant community encroachment and there are increasing limitations on air space used by low-flying helicopters. The same factors that limit the base's military value provide MCAS Tustin with an unusually high redevelopment value.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on MCAS Tustin deviated substantially from criterion 2 (availability and condition of land and facilities at receiving locations) and criterion 4 (cost implications).

Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of MCAS Tustin and the retention of the family housing and related personnel support facilities in support of MCAS El Toro. It further recommends MAG 16 be composited with MAG 39 and relocated to Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both and with MAG 39 continued tenancy at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton.

Further, the Secretary of Defense shall propose for consideration in the Fiscal Year 1992 or 1993 Defense Authorization Bill a fair-market exchange of land and facilities for construction of military facilities at Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton. If a fair exchange is not authorized in Fiscal Year 1992 or 1993, then the Secretary of Defense should proceed with the relocation to

Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both, utilizing the Defense Base Closure Account.

Naval Air Facility Midway Island

Category: Naval Air Station/Other - Unique

Mission: Logistic Support

Cost to Close: \$7.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$33.8 million;

Annual: \$6.9 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Realign Naval Air Facility Midway Island. Eliminate the mission. Retain caretaker presence to support intermittent joint special operations.

Naval Air Facility Midway Island was a likely candidate for realignment because the site-specific mission requirements are reducing and the degradations to joint operations are acceptable.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Naval Air Facility Midway Island's civilian population comprises 230 contract personnel. The community expressed no concerns with regard to the realignment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends realigning Naval Air Facility Midway Island. Eliminate the mission and operate under a caretaker status.

Naval Air Station Chase Field, Beeville, Texas

Category: Naval Air Station
Mission: Naval Aviation Training
Cost to Close: \$47.7 million
Savings: 1992-97: -\$7.5 million;
Annual: \$24.7 million
Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station Chase Field, retain the capability to be operated as an outlying field (OLF), and retain the air operations personnel necessary to operate it. Disestablish air training squadrons and all other tenants. Expand air training squadrons at Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas, and Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi, to handle any increased student output. Improve Kingsville runways for safety and efficiency with additional flight operations.

Projected reductions of carrier and air wing force structure reduce the annual strike pilot training rate (PTR) requirement, creating an excess of approximately one base. Chase Field graded lower in military value because of infrastructure deficiencies identified as facility construction required for the introduction of the T-45 trainer. Chase Field was determined to more readily function as an OLF than Naval Air Station Kingsville and Naval Air Station Meridian. Finally, realignment of Chase Field is more easily reversible should force structure increase to the point where base reconstitution may become required.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community principally argued that the Navy plan was excessively wasteful, inflicted economic and environmental damage, ignored real savings, and was predicated on false information, doubtful data, and improbable projections. The community asserted that Naval Air Station Chase Field was the most productive strike training base, suggesting that Naval Air Station Meridian

was the most logical choice for closure due to its lower productivity and greater savings achieved by consolidation of training in South Texas. The community also made issue of superior air space and zoning ordinances that insured long-term freedom from both land and air space encroachment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendation was consistent with projected force-structure reductions with the exception that the requirement for an outlying field is not fully supported by projected PTR requirements. The surge requirement for 600 PTR was revised to 450 by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

The Commission assessed that issues of relative productivity, airfield design, air space, encroachment, and weather were not significant enough to be a basis for a closure recommendation. The relevant issues were determined to be relative cost and military value.

The Commission found that DoD underestimated the costs to relocate the T-45 from Naval Air Station Kingsville to Naval Air Station Chase Field.

Naval Air Station Kingsville was considered too expensive to relocate. Naval Air Station Meridian and Naval Air Station Chase Field became the potential candidates for closure. Geographical diversity and cost were predominant factors in retaining Naval Air Station Meridian.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission agrees with the DoD recommendation to close Naval Air Station Chase Field. However, the Commission finds that, in recommending the retention of an OLF, the DoD substantially deviated from the force-structure plan. Projected reductions of carrier and air wing force structure reduce Navy-wide pilot training rate requirements to

a level that does not require retention of the Chase Field as an OLF.

The Commission also found that the DoD substantially deviated from criterion 6 in that realignment to retain an OLF imposes significantly greater adverse economic impact on the local community than closure of the entire air station.

The Commission therefore recommends the complete closure of Naval Air Station Chase Field, including the OLF.

Naval Air Station Moffett Field, California

*Category: Naval Air Station/Maritime Patrol
Aircraft*

Mission: Maritime Patrol Aircraft Support

Cost to Close: \$112 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$104.8 million;

Annual: \$72.4 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Moffett Field, decommission three active-duty maritime patrol squadrons, and redistribute the remaining squadrons among Naval Air Stations Jacksonville, Florida; Barbers Point, Hawaii; and Brunswick, Maine. Consolidate the P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron operations at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida.

Moffett Field ranked low among all naval air stations and lowest among the four bases in the maritime patrol aircraft subcategory. The base suffers from severe ground and air space encroachment. There is no potential for increased aircraft operations. Moffett Field is located in a high-cost area. Finally, a force-structure reduction of 25 percent results in an excess of one base in this subcategory.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the benefits afforded by Moffett Field are essential to the San Francisco Bay Area economy and to the nation. The long-term coexistence between businesses and the naval air station is profitable to the federal government. If the naval air station were to close, the base should remain federally operated and maintained so that defense contractors can continue to use the air facilities. While Moffett Field may no longer meet national military needs, it remains a crucial part of the high-technology and aerospace industries.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendations were consistent with projected force-structure reductions. They were also consistent with the aircraft-relocation plan proposed by DoD and with recent military construction that supports them. Under that plan, the maritime patrol force will move from its traditional 50-50 split between fleets to a new deployment strategy with 40 percent of the force in the Pacific Fleet and 60 percent in the Atlantic Fleet. The Commission found that ground and air space encroachment at Naval Air Station Moffett Field and quality of life problems for Navy personnel in the San Francisco Bay Area are significant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendations on Naval Air Station Moffett Field did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing Naval Air Station Moffett Field; transferring assigned P-3 aircraft to Naval Air Stations Jacksonville, Brunswick, and Barbers Point; and consolidating P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron operations at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. Additionally, the

Commission suggests that the base remain in federal custody in support of non-DoD agencies and industry. The Secretary should consult with NASA on possible use.

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington

Category: Carrier Airwing Support

Mission: A-6 Attack and EA-6B Electronic

Warfare Aircraft

Cost to Close: N/A

Savings: N/A

Payback: N/A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Whidbey Island and the supporting Naval Hospital Oak Harbor. Transfer aviation activities to Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. Retain the ranges in Navy custody.

Force-structure reductions in aircraft carriers and carrier airwings and the imminent departure of the A-6 Intruder medium-attack aircraft from the Navy's inventory argued for the closure of Whidbey Island. Lemoore, where the Navy wants to consolidate all West Coast attack squadrons, has available capacity. Whidbey's single-runway configuration limits operational flexibility and future growth. Whidbey's outlying field is encroached.

The economic consequences will be the most severe of any proposed closure, a 58.3 percent loss in jobs.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the economic impact would be devastating - almost 84 percent unemployment after closure. The community argued that the base's mission is not diminishing since the A-6E is being rewinged.

Whidbey actually has two runways, optimized for variable winds, and the base offers flexible training with its outlying field.

Moreover, the EA-6B will be unable to perform its electronic warfare mission at Lemoore, which lacks the ranges. The air space at Lemoore is too limited for receipt of all Whidbey's aircraft. Further, DoD underestimated the construction costs a move to Lemoore would entail.

Finally, the closure of Whidbey Island would leave a demographic void with regard to the Naval Reserves.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the A-6 force structure reduces at a rate no greater than that associated with projected carrier-air-wing force-structure reductions. While the A-6 aircraft is reaching the end of its operating service life, major aircraft modifications are being incorporated that extend its wing life until 2005, when a replacement aircraft should become available.

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island operates from two runways with only one being operational at a time. This affects operational flexibility and growth in that it limits the ability to conduct field carrier landing practice. The functional wing commander conducts this training through use of the Outlying Field Coupeville. While this optimizes training and enhances the single runway operations, noted in the DoD recommendation, it exacerbates the encroachment at the outlying field. The encroachment issue at Outlying Field Coupeville is significant. The A-6 and EA-6B aircraft are two of the loudest aircraft in the Navy inventory. The local community has not passed any zoning ordinances that preclude development near the airfield. The community has organized an aggressive campaign focusing on abating the noise. The Commission found that the noise and encroachment issues are moderate relative to other Navy bases. Expansion of the base is

possible. With the exception of Naval Air Station Lemoore, all carrier support naval air stations rate worse than Naval Air Station Whidbey Island with respect to encroachment on air installation compatible use zone management. This issue can be resolved without closing the base.

The Spectrum Aviation Division of the Federal Aviation Administration documented projected impacts to operating and training the EA-6B aircraft in California. The interference to national air space system will degrade air safety and efficiency.

The Commission found that while excess capacity exists at training ranges in California and Nevada, no coordination was conducted with DoD, other federal agencies, and local governments toward facilitating the 100 percent growth in tactical aircraft in the Central California operating areas. The need to perform this coordination was recommended in the Navy analysis, *An Analysis of Naval Airspace Utilization and Requirements (Project Blue Air Update)*, of November 2, 1987. The report documented the traffic-flow problems through choke-point corridors between the California and Nevada operating areas. The congestion imposes severe limits on the number of aircraft that can be handled as well as significant traffic-flow management problems for the Federal Aviation Administration.

The Commission found excess capacity at Naval Air Station Lemoore, the relocating base for the Whidbey Island aviation tenants. However, not enough capacity exists to preclude DoD's estimate of more than \$300 million in military construction to accommodate the aircraft from Whidbey Island. Based on varying accounts of the construction requirements by Navy organizations, the Commission found the estimate could well grow. The Commission found the return on investment to be high.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that DoD deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and

from criteria 1 and 3 by not accurately focusing on the current and future mission requirements of the carrier medium-attack mission; it also inaccurately assessed the availability of land, facilities, and air space at the current location and the full impacts on facilities and air space at Naval Air Station Lemoore. Therefore, the Commission recommends that Naval Air Station Whidbey Island and the supporting Naval Hospital Oak Harbor remain open.

Naval Station Long Beach, California

Category: Naval Station

*Mission: Support Homeported Ships
and Shipyard*

Cost to Close: \$118.6 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$201.8 million;

Annual: \$85.2 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station Long Beach and the supporting Naval Hospital Long Beach. Transfer ship-support functions and a parcel of land to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Reassign ships to other Pacific Fleet homeports.

The Navy has considerable excess pier capacity on the West Coast and will be able to accommodate its 1997 force structure at the more essential ports of San Diego and Everett. Long Beach rated low in military value because its facilities are deficient and require military construction, the location is expensive, and, unlike San Diego, it lacks capacity to homeport all Southern California ships. Finally, the closure would produce significant savings.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the Navy's Base Structure Committee overturned an

changes the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to partially close this base.

Sand Point received a low grade for military value because previous functions and missions had been reduced, culminating in the loss of almost one-half of the property. Commander, Naval Base Seattle, the Navy's Pacific Northwest regional coordinator, will move to Submarine Base Bangor, consistent with his concurrent responsibilities as Commander Submarine Group Nine. Commanding Officer, Naval Station Puget Sound, will move to Naval Station Everett when construction there is completed. Since most existing Sand Point billets will remain in the area and since new billets will be added at Everett, economic impacts will be slight.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community did not argue against the closure of Sand Point. The local government plans to use the land for park expansion and has proposed additional community uses. The main community concerns were expeditious cleanup of the site and the incompatibility of the remaining Navy brig with planned park use.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

Naval Station Sand Point has no mission, its facilities are poor, and it cannot contribute significantly to meeting surge requirements. The major tenants are relocating. The current small overhead explains the long payback period.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Puget Sound Naval Station (Sand Point). A majority of the functions will be relocated to Everett, Washington. The regional brig and a small surrounding parcel of land may be retained by

the Secretary after study. The Navy will dispose of the remainder of the property. This is a change to the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendation to partially close the installation.

Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida

Category: Training

Mission: Recruit Training; Service School
Command; Nuclear Power Schools

Cost to Close: N/A

Savings: N/A

Payback: N/A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Training Center (NTC) Orlando and the supporting Naval Hospital Orlando. The recruit training will be absorbed by NTC Great Lakes, Illinois, and NTC San Diego, California. The nuclear training function and all "A" schools will be relocated.

Force-structure reductions decrease requirements for basic recruit and follow-on training. As a result, slightly over two Recruit Training Commands (RTCs) can accommodate future requirements, leaving an excess capacity of approximately one RTC. Major savings can only be realized by closure of a complete NTC.

NTC Orlando was graded lowest in military value for the following key reasons: First, the Navy wants to retain the NTC in San Diego because of its collocation with major fleet concentrations. Second, significant capital is invested in complex, sophisticated, and expensive training devices, systems, and buildings at NTC Great Lakes. Third, NTC Great Lakes has expansion and surge capability; NTC Orlando does not. And finally, Naval Hospital Orlando was identified for closure as a "follower" because of its reduced support to the active-duty population in the area.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that the Navy improperly rated NTC Orlando lowest in expansion capability. The community also argued that one of the reasons for excluding NTC Great Lakes from consideration for closure was the estimated cost to relocate its extensive training devices but that the training devices are not recruit related.

The community argued that the major reason for not proposing the closure of San Diego was its collocation with the fleet, which is not recruit related. Also, the Navy omitted the infrastructure costs at Great Lakes to accommodate the Orlando move. The community also noted that extensive pharmacy costs had been omitted from the hospital COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions) computations. And finally, the community claimed that failure to consider Orlando's mobilization capacity adversely affected its overall ranking.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD based its closure recommendation of NTC Orlando on the basis of excess capacity in the recruit training assets. The Commission found that although NTC Orlando has excess capacity in recruit training, this excess does not carry over to the other training schools. The Commission also found that DoD based its closure recommendation of Orlando on an overall low military rating and that this rating was significantly influenced by a low rating for criterion 3. Further, the Commission found that NTC Orlando had more surge capacity than NTC San Diego which received a high rating for criterion 3. The Commission also found that Orlando has much more land than NTC San Diego, on which to develop additional facilities in the event of mobilization requirements.

The Commission found that the Navy's analysis was very sensitive to one-time costs due to the sizable military construction (MILCON) required to relocate the Orlando schools to NTC Great Lakes. The original COBRA submitted by the Navy yielded a

12-year payback and a \$57.1 million annual savings. An updated COBRA submitted by the Navy indicates a 20-year payback and a \$35.5 million annual savings after six years. The Commission's COBRA run on NTC Orlando yielded a cost to close of \$423.2 million and a payback period of 100 years.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that with regard to the DoD recommendation to close NTC Orlando, the Secretary deviated substantially from criteria 3 and 5 by not considering the significant surge capacity as required for mobilization and by overestimating return on investment. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Naval Training Center and the Naval Hospital Orlando remain open.

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Pennsylvania

Category: Naval Shipyard

Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul of Navy Ships

Cost to Close: \$102 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$38.1 million;

Annual: \$36 million

Payback: 2 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and preserve for emergent requirements. Retain the propeller facility (shops and foundry), Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, and Naval Ship System Engineering Station in active status on shipyard property.

Changes in the force structure will reduce ship-repair requirements and terminate the carrier service life extension program (CV-SLEP). Closure of a naval shipyard is necessary to balance the Navy's industrial infrastructure with this reduced workload. Maintaining the shipyard in mothball status will allow its use for unplanned requirements

or its reconstitution if future needs are greater than now anticipated.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stated that Philadelphia provides the skilled workforce and facilities that the Navy will need to repair its large conventional ships in the future. It believes that the shipyard is particularly well suited to repair Aegis-equipped ships because of specialized public and private industrial facilities in the area. The community also claimed that Philadelphia is the most cost-effective and efficient public shipyard, with the lowest man-day rate and highest productive ratio. This, along with its facilities for repairing large ships, justifies keeping the facility open during the 1990s, even at a reduced workload level, until the conventional ship workload increases.

The community pointed to the recent congressional decision to require the aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy* to undergo a CV-SLEP in Philadelphia, as a reason not to consider the shipyard for closure - the planned schedule runs too close to the end of the required closure milestone date.

The impact on the city of Philadelphia would be severe, particularly when added to proposed closures of other Philadelphia-area bases. The community believes that this is too large an impact for any single region to bear. If Philadelphia Naval Shipyard is closed and mothballed, the community stated that it would vigorously pursue legislative relief to force reversion or outleasing of shipyard property to the city.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the overall public shipyard workload is falling significantly because of force reductions and budget limitations. The projected workload in nuclear shipyards during the 1990s was found to limit the potential for closing any nuclear shipyard until the late 1990s.

The largest portion of Philadelphia's recent workload has been CV-SLEP, which the Navy desires to terminate. However, Congress has passed legislation that requires a CV-SLEP at Philadelphia. The Commission found that this CV-SLEP should be completed in mid-1996, about a year before the required closure date.

Workload is available that could be diverted from public and private East Coast shipyards to Philadelphia to bring its activity up to levels that justify keeping it open. However, this would limit the Navy's ability to meet its target of putting 30 percent of its repair work in private yards. It may increase costs at public shipyards, such as Norfolk, which would lose workload. The Commission found that retaining Philadelphia active at a low employment level, such as the 1,200-person option considered by the Navy, would increase the cost for work performed at Philadelphia over the cost for the same work performed at a public shipyard with a traditional staffing level.

The Commission found that the combination of carrier-capable drydocks at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Newport News Shipbuilding, and the mothballed drydocks at Philadelphia provide capacity for unplanned requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure and preservation of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for emergent requirements. The propeller facility, Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, and Naval Ship System Engineering Station will remain in active status on shipyard property.

Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Engineering, and Fleet Support Activities

*Category: Research, Development, Testing,
and Evaluation*

Mission: Research and Engineering Facilities

Cost to Consolidate: \$513 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$119 million;

Annual: \$107 million

*Payback: 2-10 years (varies by warfare
center)*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close 10 and realign 16 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Engineering and Fleet Support Facilities as part of a facility consolidation plan. Create four centers: Naval Air Warfare Center; Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center; Naval Surface Warfare Center; and Naval Undersea Warfare Center.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The communities argued that implementing the consolidation plan would disrupt the RDT&E, engineering, and fleet-support functions these activities perform. Much of this disruption, they claimed, would result from the loss of key scientists and engineers who would be unwilling to relocate.

Communities expressed concern that the Navy underestimated the costs of the consolidation, that it failed to evaluate all alternatives, and that the new warfare centers would not emphasize research and development sufficiently. The communities requested the Commission to wait for the completion of the DoD Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories study before making any recommendations.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the DoD did not adequately examine the availability of alternative facilities for the location of the East Coast In-Service Engineering Directorate, which the DoD proposed to be located in Portsmouth, Virginia. Existing facilities may be available in Charleston, South Carolina, elsewhere in the Norfolk metropolitan area, or at other locations. Additionally, the Committee found that development in the Portsmouth area could affect the Navy's ability to conduct tests on radars and communications equipment. While the Commission found inaccuracies in the DoD cost and savings estimates, these errors were insignificant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that, with one exception, the Secretary's proposal for closure and realignment of RDT&E, Engineering, and Fleet Support Activities did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the selection criteria.

In its recommended establishment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center's East Coast In-Service Engineering Directorate in Portsmouth, the Commission finds that the Secretary deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4 by not examining fully all available alternatives for location of the Directorate.

The Commission recommends the following closures and realignments.

Closures

Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility,
San Diego, CA

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering
Center, San Diego, CA

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center,
Vallejo, CA

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity,
Yorktown, VA

Naval Space Systems Activity,
Los Angeles, CA

Naval Ocean Systems Center Detachment,
Kaneohe, HI

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility,
Albuquerque, NM

Realignments

David Taylor Research Center Detachment,
Annapolis, MD

Naval Air Development Center,
Warminster, PA

Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ

Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ

Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, IN

Naval Coastal Systems Center,
Panama City, FL

Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD

Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY

Naval Surface Weapons Center Detachment,
White Oak, MD

Naval Underwater Systems Center
Detachment, New London, CT

Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station,
Keyport, WA

Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA

Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN

Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA

Trident Command and Control Systems
Maintenance Activity, Newport, RI

Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering
Station, Norfolk, VA

Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support
Activity, San Diego, CA

Additionally, the Commission recommends to the President that the Secretary defer implementation of this consolidation plan until January 1, 1992, in order to give the Secretary time to consider the findings and recommendations of the DoD Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories and to consult with the appropriate committees of Congress.

The Commission also believes there is a clear role for the Advisory Commission to advise the Secretary of how best to implement this consolidation plan so as to minimize the impact of the turbulence it could create, including the loss of key personnel. Clearly, the challenge of undertaking such a comprehensive reorganization will require the careful development and execution of personnel management plans to minimize the disruption of critical research and development activities in the Navy laboratory system.